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Abstract
Trust is used to minimize the uncertainty in the interactions of agents especially
in case of conflicting information from different sources. Besides conflicts among
information there can be conflicts about the trust attributed to the information
sources. In this paper, we discuss how to reason about trust by using argumen-
tation theory, so to express also the possibly conflicting motivations about trust
and distrust. The methodology of meta-argumentation allows us to model both
information and information sources as arguments and to argue about them. First,
we present a model for representing evidence provided in support of the sources’
arguments to represent the need of a trusted source to believe the information, and
we show how to model the information sources in a way that it can be argued if
they should considered untrustworthy or not. Second, we provide a focused rep-
resentation of trust about the sources in which trust concerns not only the sources
but also the information items and the relation with other information. Third, we
introduce the feedback on the trustworthiness of the sources and the information
items they propose, such that an attack to the trustworthiness of the items feeds
back on the source’s one. Finally, we distinguish two dimensions of trust, namely
competence and sincerity, and we present a formal way to express those dimen-
sions, only informally described in the socio-cognitive models of trust.
Keywords: Trust, meta-argumentation
1. Introduction
Trust is a mechanism for managing uncertain information in decision making,
taking into account also the sources besides the content of information only. In
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their interactions, agents have to reason whether they should trust or not the other
sources of information, and on the extent to which they trust those other sources.
This is important, for example, in medical contexts, where doctors have to inform
the patient of the pro and con evidence from different sources concerning some
treatment, in decision support systems where the user is not satisfied by an answer
without explanations, or in trials where judges have to specify the motivations
about which conflicting evidence they trust.
A cognitive analysis of trust is fundamental for distinguishing between inter-
nal and external attribution which predict very different strategies for building or
increasing trust, for founding mechanisms of reputation, persuasion, and argu-
mentation in trust building [1].
In this paper, we start from the cognitive model of trust introduced by Castel-
franchi and Falcone [1], and we present a cognitive model of conflicts in trust
using argumentation. In particular, the reasoning process addressed by the agents
concerning the extent to which they trust the other information sources leads to
the emergence not only of conflicts among the information but also of the con-
flicts among the sources. Since argumentation is a mechanism to reason about
conflicting information [2] it seems the suitable methodology for reason about
trust. When two pieces of information coming from different sources are conflict-
ing, they can be seen as two arguments attacking each other. When an information
source explicitly expresses a negative evaluation of the trustworthiness of another
source, it can be seen as an “attack” to the trustworthiness of the second source
modelled as an argument as well. To deal with the dimension of conflict in han-
dling trust, we propose to use argumentation theory, modelling both information
and information sources as arguments and arguing about them. In argumentation
theory [3], the arguments are considered to be accepted or not depending on the
attacks against them. In standard argumentation frameworks, neither the informa-
tion sources proposing the arguments nor their trustworthiness are considered. In
recent years, the area has seen a number of proposals [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] to introduce
the trust component in the evaluation process of the arguments. The common
drawback of these approaches is that they do not return the intrinsic complexity
of the trust notion, as highlighted instead by socio-cognitive models like [1].
The challenge of this work is to use argumentation theory not only to model
whether an information source is trusted or not, but also to understand the rea-
sons, modeled under the form of arguments, for trusting the sources in case of
conflicts concerning their trustability. This means that we need to distinguish the
conflicts about the content of the arguments which are usually specified through
an attack relation, and the conflicts about the different opinions of the sources on
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the trustworthiness of the other sources. These are two separate reasoning levels,
and the challenge is to model both of them using argumentation theory. In partic-
ular, we present a way to deal with the conflicts about trust using Dung’s abstract
argumentation framework [10]. It is not obvious how to model in a Dung argu-
mentation framework the trust about arguments and the conflicts about sources.
A Dung argumentation framework can be instantiated by the arguments and at-
tacks defined by a knowledge base. The knowledge base inferences are defined in
terms of the claims of the justified arguments, e.g., the ASPIC+ framework [11]
instantiates Dung frameworks with accounts of the structure of arguments, the na-
ture of attack and the use of preferences. In such a kind of framework, arguments
are instantiated by sentences of a single knowledge base, without reference to the
information sources. The only possibility is to include sources and trust inside
the content of the argument. This makes it difficult to distinguish between the ob-
ject level concerning content of information and the meta-level concerning trust,
sources and the conflicts among them. In reasoning about trust, the information
about the trustworthiness relations among the sources are meta-level information,
and they cannot be inserted directly into the arguments of the framework. They
influence the behavior of the framework in the sense that they lead to further con-
flicts among the sources and their information items, i.e., what the sources claim.
The following example presents informally the opinions of several witnesses
during a trial, illustrating conflicts about trust among the sources and not only
among the pieces of information they provide, where the external evaluator is the
judge:
• Witness1: I suspect that the man killed his boss in Rome. (a)
• Witness1: But his car was broken, thus he could not reach the crime scene. (b)
• Witness2: Witness1 is a compulsive liar. (c)
• Witness3: I repaired the suspect’s car at 12pm of the crime day. (d)
• Witness4: I believe that Witness3 is not able to repair that kind of car. (e)
• Witness5: The suspect has another car. (f)
• Witness6: Witness5 saw that the suspect parked 2 cars in my underground parking
garage 3 weeks ago. (g)
• Witness2: Witness5 was on holidays 3 weeks ago. (h)
• Witness7: Witness5 cannot go on holidays because of his working contract. (i)
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• Witness3: Witness7 is not competent about the working contracts of the under-
ground parking garage. (l)
• Witness1: Witness7 does not really think that Witness5 cannot go on holidays be-
cause of his working contract. (m)
In these sentences, different kinds of conflicts are highlighted among the sources
concerning their trustability. What we call the object level is illustrated by the
arguments (a) and (b): Witness1 would believe the suspect is the murderer but
he explains that another argument (the car was broken) prevents this conclusion.
Thus argument (b) attacks argument (a) since they are conflicting. But attacks
can concern also the trustability of sources, once this aspect is modelled in terms
of arguments (meta-arguments) as well. First, the sources can attack the trustwor-
thiness of the other sources, see, e.g., argument (c) attacking the trustworthiness
of Wintess1. Second, we must model the connection between the argument about
the trustability of Witness1 and the arguments (a) and (b) - as well as the attack
between the two arguments - he advances. The sources must be modelled as evi-
dence in support of their arguments or attacks, which otherwise should be consid-
ered as not acceptable. Moreover, sources can provide evidence also concerning
the other sources’ arguments, e.g., argument (g) provides evidence for argument
( f ). Third, while attacks like the one done by argument (c) are addressed against
the sources’ trustworthiness as a whole represented as an argument, conflicts about
trust can be restricted to a particular argument or attack proposed by a source who
is not considered untrustworthy in general. E.g., argument (h) expresses concerns
about the trustworthiness of argument (g) and not about the source itself. Fourth,
conflicts about the trustworthiness of the sources can be further detailed in order
to deal with the competence of the sources, e.g., argument (l), and their sincerity,
e.g., argument (m). Last, implicit in the example, there is the issue of a feedback
between the trustworthiness of the information items proposed by the sources and
the sources’ trustworthiness when what they said is attacked.
The problem in standard argumentation frameworks [3] is that it is difficult to
formalize the example above with sentences from a single knowledge base only,
e.g., to model it in ASPIC+ style instantiated argumentation. Moreover, meta-
level information such as the distinction about conflicts based on sincerity and
those based on competence cannot be represented in those frameworks. These two
trust dimensions might be independently evaluated in the argumentation process:
Bob’s sincerity/honesty (Alice believes that Bob has told her the truth) vs. Bob’s
competence (Alice trusts the judgment of Bob if he is expert). Finally, it has to
be modeled the fact that attacking Bob’s argument means attacking Bob and his
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credibility and trustworthiness as source. This is fundamental, both in the case
in which it is intentional and it is the real objective of the attack, or when it is
not intended but is a consequence of the invalidation of the arguments. This is
because of the bidirectional link between the source and its information items: the
provided item is more or less believable on the basis of the source trustworthiness,
but the invalidation of the item feedbacks on the source’s credibility.
In this paper, we address the following research question:
• How to model the socio-cognitive aspects of trust using argumentation the-
ory?
The research question breaks down into the following subquestions:
1. How to represent the information sources and attack their trustworthiness?
2. How to represent pro and con evidence, as done in Carneades [12]?
3. How to attack the sources’ trustworthiness about single information items?
4. How to represent the trust feedback between the sources and their informa-
tion items?
5. How to distinguish the two dimensions of trust, i.e., sincerity and compe-
tence?
To answer the research questions, we propose meta-argumentation [13, 14,
15, 16, 17]. Meta-argumentation provides a way to instantiate abstract arguments,
i.e., abstract arguments are treated as meta-arguments: arguments about other ar-
guments. It allows us not only to reason about arguments such as sentences from
a knowledge base indexed by the information source, but also to introduce in the
framework, at the meta-level, other instances like arguments about the trustwor-
thiness of sources. The advantage of adopting meta-argumentation is that we do
not extend Dung’s framework in order to introduce trust but we instantiate his the-
ory with meta-arguments. For a further discussion about meta-argumentation, see
Villata [17].
The sources are introduced into the argumentation framework under the form
of meta-arguments of the kind “agent i is trustable”. An attack to the trust-
worthiness of a source is modeled as an attack to the meta-argument “agent i
is trustable”. Similarly, in meta-argumentation, both arguments and attacks are
represented as meta-arguments, thus allowing arguments to attack attacks.
Each source supports the information items it proposes via meta-arguments
which represent the need of evidence to make an argument acceptable. Each argu-
ment simply “put on the table” is considered unacceptable if no sources provide
an evidence supporting it by being considered trustable.
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The information sources propose information items, i.e., arguments, and at-
tacks among these arguments. An attack to the trustworthiness of an item or an
attack is modeled as an attack in the meta-level to the evidence provided by the
source for that item.
The feedback from the sources to the information items and back is modeled
again by introducing new meta-arguments, and the attacks among them. These
meta-arguments models a sort of threshold such that if a number of attackers of
the information items proposed by a source are accepted, i.e., trustable, thus the
attacked source cannot be considered trustworthy.
Finally, the two dimensions of sincerity and competence are modeled using a
meta-argument of the kind “i is believed by source s” representing the fact that
argument i is believed by the source, and thus the source is sincere in proposing i.
This meta-argument supports the “real” meta-argument which models argument i
in the meta-level. An attack towards the source’s sincerity is modeled as an attack
towards the meta-argument representing the believed argument while an attack
to the competence is directed towards the support the “believed” meta-argument
provides to the “content” meta-argument.
Note that we do not claim that argumentation is the only way to model trust,
but we underline that, when the sources argue, they are strongly influenced by the
trustworthiness they assign to the other sources. Moreover, we do not assign a
numerical value associated to trust, because we are more interested in reasoning
about the motivations of the sources, e.g., in the case of Witness1 we have that he
explains that he does not believe a and that this is due to argument b. Finally, we
do not treat converging and diverging beliefs sources, and the source’s subjective
uncertainty [1]. This is left as future work.
The paper follows the research questions. After a brief introduction on meta-
argumentation, we describe our cognitive model of trust.
2. Argumentation theory
2.1. Abstract argumentation
A Dung-style framework is based on a binary attack relation among argu-
ments, which are abstract entities whose role is determined only by their relation
with the other arguments. A Dung-style argumentation framework [10] aims at
representing conflicts among elements called arguments. It allows to reason about
these conflicts in order to detect, starting by a set of arguments and the conflicts
among them, which are those arguments which can be considered acceptable. The
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acceptable arguments are arguments which are considered as believable by an ex-
ternal evaluator, who has a full knowledge of the argumentation framework.
Definition 1 (Argumentation framework). An argumentation framework (AF) is
a tuple 〈A,→〉 where A is a finite set of elements called arguments and → is a
binary relation called attack defined on A×A.
Definition 2 (Defence). Let 〈A,→〉 be an argumentation framework. LetS ⊆ A.
S defends a if ∀b ∈ A such that b→ a, ∃c ∈S such that c→ b.
All Dung’s semantics are based on the notion of defence. A semantics of an
argumentation theory consists of a conflict free set of arguments, i.e., a set of
arguments that does not contain an argument attacking another argument in the
set.
Definition 3 (Conflict-free). Let 〈A,→〉 be an argumentation framework. The set
S ⊆ A is conflict-free if and only if there are no a,b ∈S such that a→ b.
Like Baroni and Giacomin [18], we use a function E mapping an argumenta-
tion framework 〈A,→〉 to its set of extensions, i.e., to a set of sets of arguments.
Since they do not give a name to the function E , and it maps argumentation frame-
works to the set of accepted arguments, we call E the acceptance function.
Definition 4. Let U be the universe of arguments. An acceptance function E :
2U ×2U ×U → 22U is a partial function which is defined for each argumentation
framework 〈A,→〉 with finite A⊆U and→⊆ A×A, and maps an argumentation
framework 〈A,→〉 to sets of subsets of A: E (〈A,→〉)⊆ 2A.
The following definition summarizes the most widely used acceptability se-
mantics of arguments [10]. Which semantics is most appropriate in which cir-
cumstances depends on the application domain of the argumentation theory.
Definition 5 (Acceptability semantics). Let AF = 〈A,→〉 be an argumentation
framework. LetS ⊆ A.
• S is an admissible extension if and only if it is conflict-free and defends all
its elements.
• S is a complete extension if and only if it is conflict-free and we have
S = {a |S de f ends a}.
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• S is a grounded extension of AF if and only if S is the smallest (for set
inclusion) complete extension of AF.
• S is a preferred extension of AF if and only ifS is maximal (for set inclu-
sion) among admissible extensions of AF.
• S is a stable extension of AF if and only if S is conflict-free and attacks
all arguments of A\S .
2.2. Meta-argumentation
Meta-argumentation instantiates Dung’s theory with meta-arguments, such
that Dung’s theory is used to reason about itself [19, 15, 17]. Meta-argumentation
is a particular way to define mappings from argumentation frameworks to ex-
tended argumentation frameworks: arguments are interpreted as meta-arguments,
of which some are mapped to “argument a is accepted”, acc(a), where a is an
abstract argument from the extended argumentation framework EAF . Moreover,
auxiliary arguments are introduced to represent, for example, attacks, so that, by
being arguments themselves, they can be attacked or attack other arguments. The
meta-argumentation methodology is summarized in Figure 2.2.
EAF AF
AAAA' g
f
εε'
EAF AF
AAAA' g
f-1
εε'
Figure 1: The meta-argumentation methodology workflow.
The function f assigns to each argument a in the EAF , a meta-argument “ar-
gument a is accepted” in the basic argumentation framework. The function f−1
instantiates an AF with an EAF . We use Dung’s acceptance functions E to
find functions E ′ between EAFs and the acceptable arguments AA′ they return.
The acceptable arguments of the meta-argumentation framework are a function
of the extended argumentation framework: AA′ = E ′(EAF). The transformation
function consists of two parts: the function f−1, transforming an argumentation
framework to an extended argumentation framework, and a function g which
8
transforms the acceptable arguments of the argumentation framework into ac-
ceptable arguments of the extended argumentation framework. Summarizing,
E ′ = {( f−1(a),g(b)) | (a,b) ∈ E } and
AA′ = E ′(EAF) = g(AA) = g(E (AF)) = g(E ( f (EAF))).
The first step of the meta-argumentation approach is to define the set of ex-
tended argumentation frameworks. The second step consists of defining flatten-
ing algorithms as a function from this set of EAFs to the set of all basic AF :
f : EAF → AF . The inverse of the flattening is the instantiation of the argumenta-
tion framework. See [15, 17] for further details. We define an EAF as a set of par-
tial argumentation frameworks of the sources
〈A,〈A1,→1〉, . . . ,〈An,→n〉,→〉 [20].
Definition 6. An extended argumentation framework (EAF) is a tuple
〈A,〈A1,→1〉, . . . ,〈An,→n〉,→〉 where for each source 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ai ⊆ A ⊆ U
is a set of arguments, → is a binary attack relation on A×A, and →i is a bi-
nary relation on Ai× Ai. The universe of meta-arguments is MU = {acc(a) |
a ∈ U }∪{Xa,b,Ya,b | a,b ∈ U }, where Xa,b,Ya,b are the meta-arguments corre-
sponding to the attack a→ b. The flattening function f is given by f (EAF) =
〈MA, 7−→〉, where MA is the set of meta-arguments and 7−→ is the meta-attack
relation. For a set of arguments B ⊆MU, the unflattening function g is given by
g(B) = {a | acc(a) ∈ B}, and for sets of subsets of arguments AA ⊆ 2MU , it is
given by g(AA) = {g(B) | B ∈ AA}.
Given an acceptance function E for an AF, the extensions of accepted argu-
ments of an EAF are given by E ′(EAF) = g(E ( f (EAF))). The derived accep-
tance function E ′ of the EAF is thus E ′ = {( f−1(a),g(b)) | (a,b) ∈ E }. We say
that the source i provides evidence in support of argument a when a ∈ Ai, and that
the source i supports the attack a→ b when a→ b ∈→i.
Note that the union of all the Ai does not produce A because A contains also
those arguments which are not supported by the sources, and are just “put on the
table”. Definition 7 presents the instantiation of a basic argumentation frame-
work as a set of partial argumentation frameworks of the sources using meta-
argumentation.
Definition 7. Given an EAF = 〈A,〈A1,→1〉, . . . ,〈An,→n〉,→〉 where for each
source 1≤ i≤ n, Ai ⊆ A⊆U is a set of arguments,→⊆ A×A, and→i⊆ Ai×Ai
is a binary relation over Ai. MA ⊆ MU is {acc(a) | a ∈ A1 ∪ . . .∪ An}, and
7−→⊆MA×MA is a binary relation on MA such that:
acc(a) 7−→ Xa,b,Xa,b 7−→ Ya,b,Ya,b 7−→ acc(b) if and only if there is a source 1 ≤
i≤ n such that a,b ∈ Ai and a→ b ∈→i.
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Intuitively, the Xa,b auxiliary argument means that the attack a→ b is “in-
active”, and the Ya,b auxiliary argument means that the attack is “active”. An
argument of an EAF is acceptable if and only if it is acceptable in the flattened
argumentation framework.
3. Related work
Dix et al. [2] present trust as a major issue concerning the research challenges
for argumentation. The question Which agents are trustworthy? is important for
taking decisions and weighing the arguments of the other agents.
Also Parsons et al. [21] present the provenance of trust as one of the mecha-
nisms to be investigated in argumentation. They claim that a problem, particularly
of abstract approaches such as Dung [22], is that they cannot express the prove-
nance of trust, and the fact that argument b is attacked because b is proposed by
source s, who is not trustworthy. Starting from this observation, we propose a
model of argumentation where the arguments are related to the sources and their
acceptability is computed on the basis of the trustworthiness of the sources. Fur-
thermore, our approach goes beyond this observation by providing a feedback
such that the final quality of the arguments influences the source evaluation as
well.
Stranders et al. [5] propose an approach to trust based on argumentation that
aims at exposing the rationale behind such trusting decisions. The aim of our work
is different: we are interested in evaluating the arguments proposed by the sources
with respect to their trustworthiness, instead of explaining, thanks to argumenta-
tion theory, the decisions about trusting or not another agent.
Prade [4] presents a bipolar qualitative argumentative modeling of trust where
trust and distrust are assessed independently. The author introduces also a no-
tion of reputation which is viewed as an input information used by an agent for
revising or updating his trust evaluation. Reputation contributes to provide di-
rect arguments in favor or against a trust evaluation. In this paper, we do not use
observed behavior and reputation to compute the trust value, and we model the
socio-cognitive dynamics of trust such as the feedback and the trust dimensions,
differently from [4].
Matt et al. [6] propose to construct a Dempster-Shafer belief function both
from statistical data and from arguments in the context of contracts. We do not
have arguments expressing the trustworthiness degree assigned to the other agents,
but we accept the arguments depending on the trustworthiness of their sources.
Moreover, in our model, the trustworthiness assigned to the arguments feeds back
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to the sources dynamically changing their own trustworthiness. We distinguish
also the two dimensions of sincerity and competence.
Tang et al. [23] and Parsons et al. [7] present a framework to introduce the
sources in argumentation and to express the degrees of trust. They define trust-
extended argumentation graphs in which each premise, inference rule, and conclu-
sion is associated to the trustworthiness degree of the source proposing it. Thus,
given two arguments rebutting each other, the argument whose conclusion has a
higher trust value is accepted. They do not have the possibility to directly at-
tack the trustworthiness of the sources as well as the trustworthiness of single
arguments and attacks. Again, the feedback towards the source as well as the dis-
tinction between competence and sincerity is not considered. We do not express
the degrees of trust in a fine-grained way as done in [23, 7].
da Costa Pereira et al. [9] propose a framework where argumentation theory is
used in belief revision. In this framework, the arguments are weighted on the basis
of the trustworthiness degree of the sources proposing them. The acceptability
of the arguments is then computed by a labelling algorithm which assigns the
arguments a fuzzy value, differently from Dung-like frameworks where arguments
are either accepted or rejected. In this paper, we do not assign a numerical trust
value to the sources, and we stay close to Dung-like frameworks. The framework
of da Costa Pereira and colleagues has a number of limitations, such as the absence
of a feedback mechanism, and the fact that the notion of trust is considered as a
monolithic and not multidimensional concept.
A huge amount of research has been conducted on trust, and some of these
works are described below, even if in this paper we limit our attention to the
cognitive trust model of Castelfranchi and Falcone [1].
Castelfranchi and Falcone [1] stress the importance of this explicit cognitive
account for trust in three ways. First, they criticize the game-theoretic view of
trust which is prisoner of the Prisoner Dilemma mental frame, and reduce trust
simply to a probability or perceived risk in decisions. Second, they find the
quantitative aspects of trust (its strength or degree) on those mental ingredients
(beliefs and goals) and on their strength. Third, they claim that this cognitive
analysis of trust is fundamental for distinguishing between internal and external
attribution which predict very different strategies for building or increasing trust;
for founding mechanisms of image, reputation, persuasion, and argumentation in
trust building. Apart from the cognitive model of Castelfranchi and Falcone [1]
that define trust as “a mental state, a complex attitude of an agent x towards an-
other agent y about the behaviour/action a relevant for the goal g”, many other
definitions have been provided in the literature.
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In sociology, Gambetta [24] states that “trust is the subjective probability by
which an individual A expects that another individual B performs a given action
on which its welfare depends”. Castelfranchi and Falcone [1] observe that this
definition is correct. However, it is also quite a poor definition, since it just refers
to one dimension of trust, i.e., predictability, while ignoring the “competence”
dimension; it does not account for the meaning of “I trust B” where there is also
the decision and the act of relying on B; and it does not explain what is such an
evaluation made of and based on. Common elements of these definitions are a
consistent degree of uncertainty and conflicting information associated with trust.
Another approach to model trust using modal logic is proposed by Lorini and
Demolombe [25] where they present a concept of trust that integrates the truster’s
goal, the trustee’s action ensuring the achievement of the truster’s goal, and the
trustee’s ability and intention to do this action. In this paper, we do not refer to the
actions of the sources, but we provide a model for representing the conflicts the
sources have to deal with trust. The introduction of the actions in our cognitive
model is left as future work, and it will allow also to model willingness (source
s should think that source p not only is able and can do that action/task, but p
actually will do what s needs). In this paper, we model only the competence and
sincerity mental states of trust.
Another proposal is presented by Liau [26], in which the influence of trust
on the assimilation of information into the source’s mind is considered. The idea
is that “if agent i believes that agent j has told him the truth on p, and he trusts
the judgement of j on p, then he will also believe p”. Extending the model by
introducing goals to model the presented definitions is left for future work.
Wang and Singh [27], instead, understand trust in terms of belief and certainty:
A’s trust in B is reflected in the strength of A’s belief that B is trustworthy. They
formulate certainty in terms of evidence based on a statistical measure defined
over a probability distribution of positive outcomes. Both Liau [26] and Wang
and Singh [27] capture intuitions that play a role also in our approach, but they
propose a simplified model of the nature and dynamics of trust, as opposed to the
socio-cognitive model discussed in [1].
4. Modelling trust in meta-argumentation
In this section, we formally define our cognitive model of trust using meta-
argumentation. Using the running example described in the introduction, we show
how the model can be used to formally model it, and we present some desired
properties of our model.
12
4.1. Information sources
The reason why abstract argumentation is not suited to model trust is that
an argument, if it is not attacked by another acceptable argument, is considered
acceptable. This prevents us from modeling the situation where, for an argument
to be acceptable, it must be related to some trusted sources which provide the
evidence for such an argument to be accepted. Without an explicit representation
of the sources, it becomes impossible to talk about trust: the argument can only
be attacked by conflicting information, but it cannot be made unacceptable due to
the lack of trust in the source.
Modelling evidence is another challenge: sources are a particular type of
evidence. Arguments needing evidence are well known in legal argumentation,
where the notion of burden of proof has been introduced [12]. Meta-argumentation
provides a means to model burden of proof in abstract argumentation without ex-
tending argumentation. The idea is to associate to each argument a ∈ A put on the
table, which is represented by means of meta-argument acc(a), an auxiliary argu-
ment Wacc(a) attacking it. Being auxiliary this argument is filtered out during the
unflattening process. This means that without further information, just as being
put on the table, argument a is not acceptable since it is attacked by the accept-
able argument Wacc(a), and there is no evidence defending it against this “default”
attack, as visualized in Figure 2 for arguments a and b. This evidence is modeled
by means of the attacks towards these auxiliary arguments, e.g., Wacc(a), leading
to a reinstatement of meta-argument acc(a). Attacks are modeled as arguments
as well, so they need evidence to be acceptable. For each auxiliary argument Ya,b,
representing the activation of the attack, we associate an auxiliary argument WYa,b .
acc(a) acc(b)Xb,aYb,a
W(Yb,a)W(acc(a)) W(acc(b))
a b flattening
Figure 2: Arguments and attacks without evidence.
Sources are introduced in the meta-argumentation framework under the form
of meta-arguments “source s is trustable”, trust(s), for all the sources s. Each
argument a in the sources’ mind is supported by means of an attack on Wacc(a).
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We represent the fact that one or more information sources support the same ar-
gument by letting them attack the same Wacc(a) auxiliary argument. An example
of multiple evidence is depicted in Figure 3. In the figures, we represent the meta-
arguments associated to the information sources as boxes, and the arguments as
circles where grey elements are the acceptable ones. As for arguments, an attack
to become active needs some trusted agent.
acc(a)
trust(1)
W(acc(a))
trust(2)Source2
Source
1
a
flattening
Figure 3: An example of multiple evidence.
Notice that the assumption that there must be evidence for an argument to
be accepted is a very general and often used reasoning pattern, e.g., in causal
reasoning, where everything needs to be explained, i.e., to have a cause / to be
caused, as in the Yale shooting problem for instance. For more details about
causal reasoning, see Bochman [28].
We have now to discuss which semantics we adopt for assessing the accept-
ability of the arguments and the sources. For example, suppose that two sources
claim they are each untrustworthy. What is the extension? We adopt admissibility
based semantics. We do not ask for completeness because if one wants to know
whether a particular argument is acceptable, the whole model is not needed, just
the part related to this particular argument is needed.
The reader should not be confused by the similarity between evidence and
support [29]. The meaning of Boella et al. [29]’s notion of support is that if a is
acceptable then b is acceptable too. Note that the supported argument b is accept-
able (if not attacked) even without the support of a, i.e., a is not acceptable. Sup-
port exploits an auxiliary argument Z, but with some difference with the auxiliary
argument W . First, given a supporting b, there is a Za,b such that b attacks Za,b and
Za,b attacks a, while, here, Wacc(a) attacks the argument needing evidence. Sec-
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ond, there is a Z meta-argument for each supporting argument, while, here, there
is only one W meta-argument attacked by all the arguments and agents providing
an evidence. For more details about our model of support in argumentation, see
Boella et al. [29].
We extend the definition of EAF (Definition 6) by adding evidence provided
by the information sources and second-order attacks, such as attacks from an ar-
gument or attack to another attack. For more details about second-order attacks in
meta-argumentation, see [14, 15]. The unflattening function g and the acceptance
function E ′ are defined as above.
Definition 8. A trust-based extended argumentation framework T EAF2 with second-
order attacks is a tuple 〈A,〈A1,→1,→21〉, . . . ,〈An,→n,→2n〉,→〉 where for each
source 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ai ⊆ A ⊆ U is a set of arguments, →⊆ A×A, →i is a binary
relation on Ai×Ai,→2i is a binary relation on (Ai∪→i)×→i.
Definition 9 presents the instantiation of a T EAF2 with second-order attacks
as a set of partial frameworks of the sources using meta-argumentation.
Definition 9. Given a T EAF2 = 〈A,〈A1,→1,→21〉 . . . ,〈An,→n,→2n〉,→〉, the set
of meta-arguments MA is {trust(i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}∪ {acc(a) | a ∈ A1 ∪ . . .∪An}∪
{Xa,b,Ya,b | a,b∈ A1∪ . . .∪An}∪{Wacc(a) | a∈ A1∪ . . .∪An} and 7−→⊆MA×MA
is a binary relation on MA such that:
• acc(a) 7−→ Xa,b iff a,b ∈ Ai and a→i b, and Xa,b 7−→ Ya,b iff a,b ∈ Ai and
a→i b, and Ya,b 7−→ acc(b) iff a,b ∈ Ai and a→i b, and
• trust(i) 7−→Wacc(a) iff a ∈ Ai, and Wacc(a) 7−→ acc(a) iff a ∈ A, and
• trust(i) 7−→WYa,b iff a,b ∈ Ai and a→i b, and WYa,b 7−→Ya,b iff a,b ∈ Ai and
a→i b, and
• acc(a) 7−→ Xa,b→c iff a,b,c ∈ Ai and a→2i (b→i c), and Xa,b→c 7−→Ya,b→c
iff a,b,c ∈ Ai and a→2i (b→i c), and Ya,b→c 7−→ Yb,c iff a,b,c ∈ Ai and
a→2i (b→i c), and
• Ya,b 7−→ Yc,d iff a,b,c ∈ Ai and (a→i b)→2i (c→i d).
We say that source i is trustworthy when meta-argument trust(i) is acceptable,
and we say that i provides evidence in support of argument a (of the attack a→ b)
when a ∈ Ai (when a→ b ∈→i), and trust(i) 7−→Wacc(a) (trust(i) 7−→WYa,b).
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Figure 4: Introducing the sources in the argumentation frameworks.
Example 1. Consider the informal dialogue provided in the introduction. We
represent the sources in the argumentation framework, as shown in Figure 4.
Witness1 proposes a and b and the attack a→ b. Using the flattening function
of Definition 9, we add meta-argument trust(1) for representing Witness1 in the
framework, and we add meta-arguments acc(a) and acc(b) for the arguments of
Witness1. Witness1 provides evidence for these arguments, and the attack b→ a
by attacking the respective auxiliary arguments W. In the remainder of the paper,
we model the other conflicts highlighted in the dialogue.
Let trust(i) be the information source i and acc(a) and Ya,b the argument ai and
the attack a→i b respectively, as defined in Definitions 6 and 7. Meta-argument
trust(i) can provide evidence for acc(a) and Ya,b. Sources can attack other sources
as well as their arguments and attacks. With a slight abuse of notation, we write
a ∈ E ′(EAF), even if the latter is a set of extensions, with the intended meaning
that a is in some of the extensions of E ′. We now provide some properties of our
model.
Proposition 1. Assume admissibility based semantics, if an argument a ∈ A is not
supported by evidence, i.e., a 6∈ Ai for all i, then a is not accepted, a 6∈ E ′(EAF).
Proof. We prove the contrapositive: if argument a is accepted, then argument a
is supported by evidence. Assume argument a is accepted. Then auxiliary argu-
ment Wacc(a) is rejected due to the conflict-free principle. Meta-argument acc(a) is
defended, so Wacc(a) is attacked by an accepted argument using admissible seman-
tics. Auxiliary argument Wacc(a) can only be attacked by meta-argument trust(i).
We conclude that a is supported by evidence.
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Proposition 1 is strengthened to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. If an argument a is not supported, a 6∈ Ai, then the extensions
E ′(EAF) are precisely the same as the extensions of the AF = 〈A,→〉 in which
a 6∈ A, and the attacks on a or from a do not exist, i.e., b→ a 6∈→ and a→ c 6∈→.
Proof. Assume argument a is not supported by evidence. This means that meta-
argument Wacc(a) is accepted, and meta-argument acc(a) is not accepted. Assume
there exist an argument b such that b attacks a, b→ a, and an argument c such
that a attacks c, a→ c. We prove that the extensions of the EAF with argument a
are precisely the same as the extensions of the AF in which a does not exist, and
the attacks b→ a and a→ c do not exist either. We use case analysis.
Case 1 Assume arguments b and c are not attacked, or they are attacked by un-
accepted arguments. Then, we have that meta-argument acc(b) is accepted,
meta-argument Yb,a is accepted and meta-argument acc(a) is not accepted
as assumed, and meta-argument acc(c) is accepted, meta-argument Xa,c is
accepted, Ya,c is not accepted and acc(a) is not accepted as assumed. The
extension of this EAF includes b and c, but it does not include a.
Case 2 Assume arguments b and c are attacked by accepted arguments. Then, we
have that meta-argument acc(b) is unaccepted, meta-argument Yb,a is un-
accepted and meta-argument acc(a) is not accepted as assumed, and meta-
argument acc(c) is unaccepted, meta-argument Xa,c is accepted, Ya,c is not
accepted and acc(a) is not accepted as assumed. The extension of this EAF
does not include a, b, and c.
Case 3 Assume argument b is not attacked or it is attacked by unaccepted argu-
ments, and c is attacked by accepted arguments. Then, we have that meta-
argument acc(b) is accepted, meta-argument Yb,a is accepted and meta-
argument acc(a) is not accepted as assumed, and meta-argument acc(c) is
unaccepted, meta-argument Xa,c is accepted, Ya,c is not accepted and acc(a)
is not accepted as assumed. The extension of this EAF includes b, but it
does not include a and c.
Case 4 Assume argument b is attacked by accepted arguments and c is not at-
tacked or it is attacked by unaccepted arguments. Then, we have that meta-
argument acc(b) is unaccepted, meta-argument Yb,a is unaccepted and meta-
argument acc(a) is not accepted as assumed, and meta-argument acc(c) is
accepted, meta-argument Xa,c is accepted, Ya,c is not accepted and acc(a) is
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not accepted as assumed. The extension of this EAF includes c, but it does
not include a and b.
Now we consider the same EAF without argument a, such that the attacks
b→ a and a→ c do not exist.
Case 1 Assume arguments b and c are not attacked, or they are attacked by un-
accepted arguments. Then, we have that meta-argument acc(b) is accepted
and meta-argument acc(c) is accepted too. Each extension of this AF in-
cludes b and c.
Case 2 Assume arguments b and c are attacked by accepted arguments. Then, we
have that meta-argument acc(b) is unaccepted, and meta-argument acc(c)
is unaccepted either. Each extension of this AF does not include b, and c.
Case 3 Assume argument b is not attacked or it is attacked by unaccepted argu-
ments, and c is attacked by accepted arguments. Then, we have that meta-
argument acc(b) is accepted, and meta-argument acc(c) is unaccepted. Each
extension of this AF includes b, but it does not include c.
Case 4 Assume argument b is attacked by accepted arguments and c is not at-
tacked or it is attacked by unaccepted arguments. Then, we have that meta-
argument acc(b) is unaccepted, and meta-argument acc(c) is accepted. Each
extension of this AF includes c, but it does not include b.
Thus, the extensions of the EAF including argument a without evidence, and
the EAF not including argument a are the same.
Proposition 3. If an attack a→ b is not supported, i.e., a→ b 6∈→i, then the
extensions E ′(EAF) are precisely the same as the extensions of the AF = 〈A,→〉,
in which the attack does not exist, a→ b 6∈→.
The proof of Proposition 3 follows Proof 4.1.
Proposition 4. Assume EAF is a framework in which argument a is supported by
the trustworthy source i, and there is another trustworthy source j. In that case,
the extensions are the same if also j provides an evidence in support of a.
Proof. Assume argument a is supported by the trustworthy source i. This means
that trust(i) is accepted. It supports by evidence argument a which means that
meta-argument trust(i) attacks meta-argument Wacc(a): meta-argument trust(i) is
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accepted, thus meta-argument Xtrust(i),Wacc(a) is unaccepted, meta-argument Ytrust(i),Wacc(a)
is accepted and meta-argument Wacc(a) is unaccepted. Thus, meta-argument acc(a)
is accepted. We use case analysis.
Case 1 : Let argument a not be attacked or be attacked by unaccepted arguments.
This means that meta-argument acc(a) is accepted, and argument a is part
of each extension of the EAF .
Case 2 : Let argument a be attacked by accepted arguments. This means that
meta-argument acc(a) is not accepted, and argument a is not part of the
extensions of the EAF .
Assume there is another trustworthy source j. This means that meta-argument
trust( j) is accepted. This source supports by evidence argument a, too. This
means that trust( j) attacks meta-argument Wacc(a): meta-argument trust( j) is ac-
cepted, thus meta-argument Xtrust( j),Wacc(a) is unaccepted, meta-argument Ytrust( j),Wacc(a)
is accepted and meta-argument Wacc(a) is unaccepted. Thus, meta-argument acc(a)
is accepted. We use case analysis.
Case 1 : Let argument a not be attacked or be attacked by unaccepted arguments.
This means that meta-argument acc(a) is accepted, and argument a is part
of each extension of the EAF .
Case 2 : Let argument a be attacked by accepted arguments. This means that
meta-argument acc(a) is not accepted, and argument a is not part of the
extensions of the EAF .
Thus, the extensions of the EAF are the same if there is also another source j,
in addition to i, supporting argument a.
4.2. Evidence for arguments
The evidence in favor of the arguments is an evidence provided by the agents
for the arguments/attacks they propose. At the meta-level, this is modeled as an
attack from meta-argument trust(i) to W auxiliary arguments. However, there are
other cases in which more evidence is necessary to support the acceptability of
an argument. Consider the case of Witness1. His trustworthiness is attacked by
Witness2. What happens to the evidence provided by Witness1? Since the source
is not trustworthy then it cannot provide evidence. Meta-argument trust(1) be-
comes not acceptable and the same happens to all its arguments and attacks. What
is needed to make them acceptable again is more evidence. This evidence can be
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provided under the form of another argument which reinstates the acceptability of
these information items.
Definition 9 allows only the sources to directly provide evidence for the infor-
mation items. As for Witness5 and Witness6 in the dialogue, sources can provide
evidence also by means of other arguments. This cannot be represented using the
extended argumentation framework of Definition 9, this is why we need to extend
it with an evidence relation# representing evidence provided under the form of
arguments for the information items of the other sources.
Definition 10. A T EAF2 with evidence is a tuple 〈A,〈A1,→1,→21,#1〉, . . . ,
〈An,→n,→2n,#n〉,→〉 where #i is a binary relation on Ai×A j and the set of
meta-arguments MA is {trust(i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {acc(a) | a ∈ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ An} ∪
{Xa,b,Ya,b | a,b∈ A1∪ . . .∪An}∪{Wacc(a) | a∈ A1∪ . . .∪An} and 7−→⊆MA×MA
is a binary relation on MA such that hold the conditions of Definition 9, and:
acc(a) 7−→Wacc(b) iff a ∈ Ai,b ∈ A j and a#i b, and Wacc(b) 7−→ acc(b) iff a ∈
Ai,b ∈ A j and a#i b.
We say that a source i supports the evidence provided by other source j to
argument a when a ∈ Ai,b ∈ A j, and acc(a) 7−→Wacc(b).
The following properties hold for Definition 10.
Proposition 5. If there are multiple arguments a1 ∈ A1, . . . ,an ∈ An providing
evidence for an argument b ∈ Ak (or an attack), and there are no attacks on the
arguments, c1 → a1 6∈→1, . . . ,cn → an 6∈→n, then b (or the attack) is accepted,
b ∈ E ′(EAF), iff at least one of the sources providing evidence for arguments
a1, . . . ,an is trustworthy, i.e., trust( j) ∈ E ( f (EAF)) with j ∈ 1, . . . ,n.
Proof. Assume argument b is not directly supported by evidence by an informa-
tion source or the source supporting it is untrustworthy. This means that meta-
argument Wacc(b) is accepted, and meta-argument acc(b) is not accepted. Assume
now that argument b is not attacked by other arguments, or it is attacked by unac-
cepted arguments, and assume there are n arguments a1, . . . ,an providing evidence
for argument b. Assume there not exist argument ci such that it attacks ai, and ci
is accepted.
First, we show that if there is at least one trustworthy source proposing an
argument ai which provides evidence for argument b, then b is accepted. This
means that trust(i) is accepted for 1 ≤ i ≥ n. Then Wacc(ai) is unaccepted, and
acc(a) is accepted, Wacc(b) is unaccepted and acc(b) is accepted.
Now, we show that if argument b is accepted then there is at least one trustwor-
thy source providing evidence for it through argument ai. This means that acc(b)
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is accepted, and Wacc(b) is not accepted. Thus there is at least on Yacc(ai),Wacc(b)
which is accepted. This means that acc(ai) is accepted, and trust(i) is accepted.
Proposition 6. Suppose two sources i and j provide evidence through arguments
b and c respectively for the same argument a, i.e., b# a ∈#i and c# a ∈# j,
then it is the same whether a trustworthy source k supports the evidence provided
by i or j, i.e., d ∈ Ak.
Proof. Assume source k is trustworthy. Source k provides evidence for argu-
ment d. Assume there are no other attacks on d. This means that meta-argument
trust(k) attacks meta-argument Wacc(d) and Wacc(d) attacks meta-argument acc(d).
The accepted meta-arguments are acc(d) and trust(k). We use case analysis.
Case 1 : Let the sources i and j be trustworthy, and let their arguments not be
attacked by other arguments. This means that meta-arguments trust(i) and
trust( j) are accepted, meta-arguments acc(b) and acc(c) are accepted and
meta-argument acc(a) is accepted. The support of source k through argu-
ment d consists in an attack from meta-argument acc(d) to meta-argument
Wacc(b) or to meta-argument Wacc(c). Both these meta-arguments are not
accepted because of the attacks from trust(i) and trust( j), respectively.
Case 2 : Let the sources i and j be untrustworthy, and let their arguments not
be attacked by other arguments. This means that meta-arguments trust(i)
and trust( j) are unaccepted. Thus, meta-arguments acc(b) and acc(c) are
unaccepted. The evidence provided through argument d by source k con-
sists in an attack from meta-argument acc(d) to meta-argument Wacc(b) or
Wacc(c). Independently on which meta-argument is attacked, this means that
meta-argument acc(b) or meta-argument acc(c) is accepted, meta-argument
Wacc(a) is not accepted and meta-argument acc(a) is accepted.
Case 3 : Let source i (or j) be trustworthy and source j (or i) be untrustworthy,
and let their arguments not be attacked by other arguments. This means that
meta-argument trust(i) is accepted and meta-argument trust( j) is not trust-
worthy, meta-argument Wacc(b) is unaccepted and meta-argument Wacc(c)
is accepted, meta-argument acc(b) is accepted and meta-argument acc(c)
is not accepted. Thus meta-argument Wacc(a) is not accepted and meta-
argument acc(a) is accepted. The evidence provided through argument d to
argument a does not change if meta-argument acc(c) attacks meta-argument
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Wacc(b) or Wacc(c), because meta-argument Wacc(a) is attacked by both acc(b)
and acc(c). Thus, meta-argument acc(a) is accepted independently from
the evidence provided by argument d.
Example 2. Consider the dialogue in the introduction. Argument g by Witness6
is an evidence for argument f by Witness5. This evidence is expressed in meta-
argumentation in the same way as evidence provided by the sources, such as an
attack to Wacc( f ) attacking acc( f ). In this case, it is meta-argument acc(g) which
attacks Wacc( f ), as visualized in Figure 5.
f
Witness5
g
Witness6
flattening
trust(5)
acc(g)
trust(6)
acc(f)
W(acc(f))W(acc(g))
Figure 5: Introducing evidence for the arguments.
4.3. Focused trust relationships
In our model, trust is represented as the absence of an attack towards the
sources or towards their information items, and as the presence of evidence in
favor of the pieces of information. On the contrary, the distrust relationship is
modeled as a lack of evidence in support of the information items or as a direct
attack towards the sources and their pieces of information.
In the informal dialogue, Witness2 attacks the trustworthiness of Witness1 as a
credible witness. In this way, she is attacking each argument and attack proposed
by Witness1. Witness4, instead, is not arguing against Witness3 but she is arguing
against the attack d→ b as it is proposed by Witness3. Finally, for Witness2 the
untrustworthiness of Witness6 is related only to the argument g. We propose a
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focused view of trust in which the information sources may be attacked for being
untrustworthy or for being untrustworthy only concerning a particular argument
or attack. Definition 11 presents an EAF in which a new relation DT between
sources is given to represent distrust.
Definition 11. A trust-based extended argumentation framework DT EAF2 is a
tuple 〈A,〈A1,→1,→21,#1,DT1〉, . . . ,〈An,→n,→2n,#n,DTn〉,→〉 where for each
source 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ai ⊆ A ⊆ U is a set of arguments, →⊆ A×A, →i⊆ Ai×Ai
is a binary relation, →2i is a binary relation on (Ai∪ →i)×→i, #i is a binary
relation on Ai×A j, and DT ⊆ Ai×ϑ is a binary relation such that ϑ = j or ϑ ∈
A j or ϑ ∈→ j.
Definition 12 shows how to instantiate a DT EAF2 enriched with a distrust
relation with meta-arguments. In particular, the last three points of Definition 12
model, respectively, a distrust relationship towards an agent, a distrust relationship
towards an argument, and a distrust relationship towards an attack. The unflatten-
ing function g and the acceptance function E ′ are defined as above.
Definition 12. Given a DT EAF2 = 〈A,〈A1,→1,→21,#1,DT1〉, . . . ,
〈An,→n,→2n,#n,DTn〉,→〉, see Definition 11, the set of meta-arguments MA is
{trust(i) | 1≤ i≤ n}∪{acc(a) | a ∈ A1∪ . . .∪An}∪{Xa,b,Ya,b | a,b ∈ A1∪ . . .∪
An}∪{Wacc(a) | a∈ A1∪ . . .∪An} and 7−→⊆MA×MA is a binary relation on MA
such that hold the conditions of Definitions 9 and 10, and:
• acc(a) 7−→ Xa,b iff a,b ∈ Ai and a→i b, and Xa,b 7−→ Ya,b iff a,b ∈ Ai and
a→i b, and Ya,b 7−→ acc(b) iff a,b ∈ Ai and a→i b, and
• trust(i) 7−→ Xtrust(i),Wacc(a) iff a ∈ Ai, and Xtrust(i),Wacc(a) 7−→ Ytrust(i),Wacc(a) iff
a ∈ Ai, and Ytrust(i),Wacc(a) 7−→Wacc(a) iff a ∈ Ai, and Wacc(a) 7−→ acc(a) iff
a ∈ Ai, and
• trust(i) 7−→Xtrust(i),WYa,b iff a,b∈Ai and a→i b, and Xtrust(i),WYa,b 7−→Ytrust(i),WYa,b
iff a,b ∈ Ai and a→i b, and Ytrust(i),WYa,b 7−→WYa,b iff a,b ∈ Ai and a→i b,
and WYa,b 7−→ Ya,b iff a,b ∈ Ai and a→i b, and
• trust(i) 7−→ Wacc(a) iff a ∈ Ai and aDTitrust( j), and Wacc(a) 7−→ acc(a)
iff a ∈ A and aDTitrust( j), and acc(a) 7−→ Xacc(a),trust( j) iff a ∈ Ai and
aDTitrust( j), and Xacc(a),trust( j) 7−→Yacc(a),trust( j) iff a∈Ai and aDTitrust( j),
and Yacc(a),trust( j) 7−→ trust( j) iff a ∈ Ai and aDTitrust( j), and
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• trust(i) 7−→Wacc(a) iff a ∈ Ai,b ∈ A j and aDTib, and Wacc(a) 7−→ acc(a) iff
a∈ A,b∈ A j and aDTib, and acc(a) 7−→ Xacc(a),Ytrust( j),Wacc(b) iff a∈ Ai,b∈ A j
and aDTib, and Xacc(a),Ytrust( j),Wacc(b)
7−→ Yacc(a),Ytrust( j),Wacc(b) iff a ∈ Ai,b ∈ A j
and aDTib, and Yacc(a),Ytrust( j),Wacc(b)
7−→ Ytrust( j),Wacc(b) iff a ∈ Ai,b ∈ A j and
aDTib, and
• trust(i) 7−→Wacc(a) iff a ∈ Ai,b,c ∈ A j and aDTi(b→ j c), and Wacc(a) 7−→
acc(a) iff a∈A,b,c∈A j and aDTi(b→ j c), and acc(a) 7−→Xacc(a),Ytrust( j),WYb,c
iff a∈Ai,b,c∈A j and aDTi(b→ j c), and Xacc(a),Ytrust( j),WYb,c 7−→Yacc(a),Ytrust( j),WYb,c
iff a∈ Ai,b,c∈ A j and aDTi(b→ j c), and Yacc(a),Ytrust( j),WYb,c 7−→Ytrust( j),WYb,c
iff a ∈ Ai,b,c ∈ A j and aDTi(b→ j c).
We say that a source j is untrustworthy when there is an attack from an ar-
gument a ∈ Ai to j, aDTitrust( j). We say that an argument a ∈ A j or attack
a→ j b ∈→ j is untrustworthy when there is an attack from an argument c ∈ Ai to
a or a→ j b, cDTia or cDTi(a→ j b).
Proposition 7. Assume that source i is the only source providing evidence for
argument a∈Ai and attack c→ b∈→i, and assume admissibility based semantics.
If the information source i is considered to be untrustworthy, then a and c→ b are
not acceptable.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive: if the arguments and attacks supported by
an information source i are acceptable then the information source i is considered
to be trustworthy. Assume the source supports argument a and the attack c→
b and assume that this argument and this attack are acceptable. Then auxiliary
arguments Wacc(a) and WYc,b are rejected due to the conflict-free principle. Meta-
arguments acc(a) and Yc,b are defended, thus Wacc(a) and WYc,b are attacked by an
acceptable argument, using admissible semantics. We assumed that this argument
and this attack have no other evidence, so auxiliary arguments Wacc(a) and WYc,b
can only be attacked by meta-argument trust(i). Since they are attacked by an
acceptable argument, we conclude that the source i is acceptable.
Example 3. Figure 6.a shows that Witness2 attacks the trustworthiness of Wit-
ness1 by means of argument c. In meta-argumentation, we have that trust(2)
provides evidence for acc(c) by attacking meta-argument Wacc(c) and, with meta-
arguments X ,Y , it attacks trust(1). This means that if Witness1 is untrustworthy
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Figure 6: Focused trust in argumentation.
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then each of his arguments and attacks cannot be acceptable either, if there is
no more evidence. The set of acceptable arguments for the meta-argumentation
framework is E ( f ( f ocus1)) = {trust(2),acc(c),Yacc(c),trust(1)}. In Figure 6.b-
c, instead, the attack is directed against a precise information item provided by
the source. In particular, Witness4 attacks the attack d → b as provided by Wit-
ness3. This is achieved in meta-argumentation by means of an attack from meta-
argument acc(e), for which trust(4) provides evidence, to the attack characterized
by auxiliary argument Yd,b. The set of acceptable arguments is
E ( f ( f ocus2))= {trust(4), trust(3),acc(d),acc(e),acc(b),Yacc(e),Ytrust(3),WYb,d ,WYd,b}.
Witness3’s attack d→ b is evaluated as untrustworthy by Witness4 and thus it is
not acceptable. Finally, Witness2 evaluates Witness6 as untrustworthy concerning
argument g. In meta-argumentation, trust(2), by means of meta-argument acc(h),
attacks meta-argument acc(g) proposed by trust(6). The set of acceptable argu-
ments is E ( f ( f ocus3)) = {trust(2), trust(6),acc(h),Yacc(h),Ytrust(6),Wacc(g) ,Wacc(g)}.
4.4. Feedback from information items to sources and back
In the previous sections, we have introduced the information sources in the
argumentation framework in order to deal with the conflicts about trust. More-
over, in our framework, the agents are allowed to attack the trustworthiness of the
other information sources or the trustworthiness of the single information items
the sources propose. The relation, concerning trust, among the sources and the ar-
guments or attacks they support is in one direction only. In particular, if an agent
is considered not to be trustworthy, then also all the information items proposed
by such an agent are considered untrustworthy. But what happens to the trust-
worthiness of an agent which is not directly attacked but it has all its information
items (or at least n information items) attacked? In the current framework, these
attacked items does not effect the trustworthiness of the sources proposing them,
e.g., if a source has the trustworthiness of all its information items attacked, the
source’s trustworthiness is accepted.
The idea proposed by Castelfranchi and Falcone [1] is that there is a bidirec-
tional link between the source and its information items: the provided data is more
or less believable on the basis of the source’s trustworthiness, but there is feed-
back such that the invalidation of the data feeds back on the sources’ credibility.
The overall amount and sign (increment or decrement) of the feedback depends
on how much the overall quality of the message surprises the agent, with respect
to its prior assessment of the source trustworthiness. This captures the principle
that information quality should change one’s assessment of its source only when
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the agent learns something new about the capacity of the source to deliver infor-
mation of either high or low quality. In other words, there should be a feedback
on the source only when the quality of its argument tells me something new about
the source’s trustworthiness, revealing my previous opinion to be wrong. Other-
wise, the quality of the new argument just confirms my previous assessment of
the source, and confirmation, by definition, consolidates a pre-existing judgment,
rather than modifying it. This points to the role of prediction in feedback dynam-
ics from arguments to sources, and this prediction is based on the pre-existing
degree of trustworthiness of the source of a given argument. In this paper, we
does not represent the increment of the feedback towards the information source.
In our framework, a trustworthy source is mirrored in an accepted meta-argument
of the kind trust(i), and this acceptability cannot be improved. The representation
of this kind of feedback would be possible in numerical approaches to trust repre-
sentation in argumentation, as proposed for instance by da Costa Pereira et al. [9]
and Parsons et al. [7].
a b
c
Witness1
acc(c)
trust(1)
Wacc(b)
Wacc(a)
acc(b)
acc(a)
X
Y PATTERN WITHTHRESHOLD
e.g., maximum number 
of attacks to information 
items of trust(1)
flattening
XY
Figure 7: Feedback between the information items and sources.
In this section, we rely on this analysis of the trust dynamics phenomenon,
in order to model the feedback from the information items to the sources. For
instance, the fact that the major part of the arguments of a source are considered
untrustworthy is seen as a negative experience, and leads to the decrease of the
trustworthiness of the sources itself. In this paper, we do not consider the unpre-
dictable cases analyzed by Castelfranchi and Falcone [1], where trust decreases
with positive experiences, and increases with negative ones. The representation
of these cases is left as future work.
We introduce the feedback from the information items to the sources, in such a
way that, following different criteria, the untrustworthiness of the items influences
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the trustworthiness of its source. The general idea of our approach is visualized
in Figure 7. First, we insert in the framework a pattern which is activated if the
number of attacks to this pattern exceeds a certain threshold. In this case, the pat-
tern activates an attack towards the meta-argument representing the information
source. The activation pattern is visualized in Figure 8, and it comes from the idea
of conjunctive and proof standard patterns like those defined by Villata et al. [30].
The arguments attacking the information items proposed by the source attack also
the pattern, in particular, each argument arg attacking the items attacks also one
of the X meta-arguments of the pattern. These meta-arguments conjunctively at-
tack argument s, which attacks the meta-argument representing the source. The
pattern acts like a filter that raises the attack against the source only if the amount
of incoming attacks is achieved.
a
z
.
. s
a
z
.
. s
x1
xnflattening
Figure 8: The activation pattern with a threshold of n arguments.
Second, for each attack to the trustworthiness of one of the information items
of a source, this attack is duplicated and it is addressed also towards the pattern
which attacks the information source. Summarizing, every attack to the arguments
or attacks of a source is addressed also, i.e., towards a pattern which has the aim
to attack directly the trustworthiness of the source, if the number of attack exceeds
the given threshold.
Example 4. Let us consider now the example proposed in Figure 7. In the infor-
mal dialogue, Witness1 proposes two arguments a and b, and the attack between
them. Consider now the introduction of a new argument n, which attacks the
trustworthiness of argument b as proposed by Witness1. In the flattened frame-
work, the meta-argument trust(1) provides evidence for meta-arguments acc(a)
and acc(b) by attacking the auxiliary arguments Wacc(a) and Wacc(b). The attack
of the new argument is addressed from meta-argument acc(n) to the auxiliary ar-
gument YWacc(b) which attacks Wacc(b). Since we are interested in modeling also the
feedback from the information items to the sources, we add an additional attack
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from meta-argument acc(n) to the pattern we use to measure the number of at-
tacks to the information items proposed by Witness1. From this pattern, an attack
is raised against the meta-argument trust(1). If the number of attacks towards the
pattern overcomes the given threshold, then the attack against trust(1) becomes
active, and trust(1) becomes unacceptable, i.e., Witness1 is considered untrust-
worthy: so argument a is not acceptable.
We model feedback using the pattern associated with the threshold in order
to maintain the choice of meta-argumentation, and avoiding the introduction of
numerical techniques, as done for instance by da Costa Pereira et al. [9].
4.5. Modelling trust as a multidimensional concept
In this section, we investigate two dimensions of trust that have to be inde-
pendently evaluated such as the sincerity or credibility of a source and its compe-
tence. We simplify Castelfranchi and Falcone’s model [1], and focus only on two
broad categories of relevant features in the source: competence (to what extent
the source is deemed able to deliver a correct argument), and sincerity (to what
extent the source is considered willing to provide a correct argument), both of
which contribute to determine the source’s overall trustworthiness. The evalua-
tions of competence and sincerity are allowed to change across different domains.
For instance, a reliable doctor will be considered competent in the health domain,
but not necessarily so when suggesting a restaurant; conversely, a food critic is
typically assumed to be trustworthy on the latter domain but not on the former.
Similarly, one might think that a colleague who is competing with her for a pro-
motion is likely to be insincere in giving her tips on how to improve her career,
and yet there is no reason to doubt his sincerity when he suggests a movie. Here,
we consider competence and sincerity as two possible dimensions for assessing
the trustworthiness of a source.
We represent competence and sincerity using meta-arguments, and the attacks
to these meta-arguments represent the conflicts about trust regarding the precise
dimension of trust. The introduction in our framework of these two dimensions
is visualized in Figure 9. We start from the usual situation in which an informa-
tion source supports an argument, namely Witness7 supports argument i in the
informal dialogue. We want to distinguish the two possible conflicts concerning
argument i: a conflict meaning that Witness7 is considered untrustworthy on the
competence regarding argument i, and a conflict meaning that Witness7 is consid-
ered untrustworthy on the sincerity in proposing argument i. An example of the
first case is given in the dialogue by the attack of argument l to argument i, and
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an example of the second case is given by the attack of argument m to argument i.
Note that even if both arguments l and m attack argument i, they attack different
dimensions of argument i.
Witness7 i
Bi i
Witness7
m l
Attack towards the 
sincerity of
Witness7 concerning 
argument i
Attack towards the 
competence of
Witness7 concerning 
argument i
Argument supported 
by the beliefs of 
Witness7
Figure 9: Modelling competence and sincerity.
We model sincerity and competence as visualized in Figure 9. Meta-argument
Bi represents the belief associated to the information source concerning argument
i, and it means “the source believes argument i” where argument i is the argument
supported by the beliefs of the source. The meta-argument Bi supports argument
i, as a result of the competence attributed to the source. In this framework, an
attack towards the sincerity of the source is addressed against the meta-argument
representing the belief of the source, i.e., against meta-argument Bi. An attack
towards the competence of the source is addressed, instead, against the support
relation between meta-argument Bi and argument i. This attack means that the
source believes argument i but it is not evaluated competent concerning i. Note
that an attack towards argument i is treated as in the previous sections, since it is
a direct attack towards the content of argument i.
Definition 13. A trust-based extended argumentation framework DT EAF2CS is a
tuple 〈A,〈A1,→1,→21,#1,DT1,DT1s,DT1c〉, . . . ,〈An,→n,→2n,#n,DTn,DTns,DTnc〉,→
〉 where for each source 1≤ i≤ n, Ai ⊆ A⊆U is a set of arguments,→⊆ A×A,
→i⊆ Ai×Ai is a binary relation,→2i is a binary relation on (Ai∪→i)×→i,#i
is a binary relation on Ai×A j, and DT ⊆ Ai×ϑ is a binary relation such that
ϑ = j, and DTs ⊆ Ai×ϑ is a binary relation such that ϑ ∈ A j or ϑ ∈→ j, and
DTc ⊆ Ai×ϑ is a binary relation such that ϑ ∈ A j or ϑ ∈→ j.
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Definition 14 shows how to instantiate an extended argumentation framework
enriched with a distrust relation, which distinguishes distrust concerning compe-
tence and sincerity. The unflattening function g and the acceptance function E ′
are defined as above.
Definition 14. Given a DT EAF2CS = 〈A,〈A1,→1,→21,#1,DT1,DT1s,DT1c〉, . . . ,〈An,→n
,→2n,#n,DTn,DTns,DTnc〉,→〉, see Definition 13, the set of meta-arguments MA
is {trust(i) | 1≤ i≤ n}∪{acc(a) | a∈ A1∪ . . .∪An}∪{Xa,b,Ya,b | a,b∈ A1∪ . . .∪
An}∪{Wacc(a) | a∈ A1∪ . . .∪An}∪{Ba | a∈ A1∪ . . .∪An} and 7−→⊆MA×MA is
a binary relation on MA such that hold the conditions of Definitions 9, 10, and 12,
and:
• Ba 7−→ XBa,a iff a ∈ Ai, and XBa,a 7−→YBa,a iff a ∈ Ai, and YBa,a 7−→WBa,a iff
a ∈ Ai, and WBa,a 7−→ acc(a) iff a ∈ Ai and
• Ba→b 7−→ XBa→b,a→b iff a→ b ∈→i, and XBa→b,a→b 7−→ YBa→b,a→b iff a→
b∈→i, and YBa→b,a→b 7−→WBa→b,a→b iff a→ b∈→i, and WBa→b,a→b 7−→Ya,b
iff a→ b ∈→i and
• trust(i) 7−→ Xtrust(i),Wacc(a) iff a ∈ Ai, and Xtrust(i),Wacc(a) 7−→ Ytrust(i),Wacc(a) iff
a∈ Ai, and Ytrust(i),Wacc(a) 7−→Wacc(a) iff a∈ Ai, and Wacc(a) 7−→ Ba iff a∈ Ai,
and
• trust(i) 7−→Xtrust(i),WYa,b iff a,b∈Ai and a→i b, and Xtrust(i),WYa,b 7−→Ytrust(i),WYa,b
iff a,b ∈ Ai and a→i b, and Ytrust(i),WYa,b 7−→WYa,b iff a,b ∈ Ai and a→i b,
and WYa,b 7−→ Ba→b iff a,b ∈ Ai and a→i b, and
• acc(a) 7−→ Bb iff a ∈ Ai,b ∈ A j and aDTisb, and
• acc(a) 7−→ YBa,a iff a ∈ Ai,b ∈ A j and aDTicb, and
• acc(a) 7−→ Bb→c iff a ∈ Ai,b,c ∈ A j and aDTis(b→ j c), and
• acc(a) 7−→ YBb→c,b→c iff a ∈ Ai,b,c ∈ A j and aDTic(b→ j c).
We say that an argument a ∈ Ai or attack a→ b ∈→i is untrustworthy con-
cerning sincerity when there is an attack from an argument c ∈ A j to Ba or Ba→b,
cDTjsa or cDTjs(a→ b). We say that an argument a ∈ Ai or attack a→ b ∈→i is
untrustworthy concerning competence when there is an attack from an argument
c ∈ A j to YBa,a or YBa→b,a→b, cDTjca or cDTjc(a→ b).
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trust(7)
Bi
W(acc(i))
acc(m) acc(l)
acc(i)Y(W(Bi,i)acc(i))X(W(Bi,i)acc(i))W(Bi, i)Y(Bi, i)X(Bi, i)
Figure 10: The flattening of the competence and sincerity’s framework.
The flattening of the new framework distinguishing between attacks towards
the sincerity of a source in proposing an information item, and attacks towards
the competence of a source in proposing an information item is formalized in
Definition 14. An example of flattening is visualized in Figure 10.
Example 5. The meta-argument representing Witness7, trust(7), supports by means
of the auxiliary argument Wacc(i) meta-argument Bi representing the fact that ar-
gument i is believed by Witness7. If this meta-argument is accepted, it means
that there are no doubts about the sincerity of Witness7 concerning argument i.
Meta-argument Bi supports meta-argument acc(i), representing argument i in the
meta-level. This support relation is built in the same way as the support between
the sources and their information items, which means that meta-argument Bi at-
tacks, towards auxiliary arguments X and Y , the auxiliary argument WBi,i. This
auxiliary argument attacks, always by means of X and Y auxiliary arguments,
the meta-argument acc(i). In this framework, the acceptability of meta-argument
acc(i) depends on the acceptability of the belief regarding argument i. An at-
tack towards the competence of argument i, instead, is addressed against meta-
argument YBi,i. In this way, argument acc(i) can be made unacceptable in two
ways: (1) by attacking directly meta-argument Bi (sincerity), and (2) by attacking
the attack from Bi to WBi,i (competence). Figure 10 shows these two cases with the
attacks from argument m and argument l, respectively.
Note that we do
Proposition 8. Suppose a trustworthy source i provides evidence for argument
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a, and another trustworthy source j provides evidence for an argument b where
b attacks the trustworthiness of argument a, then the extensions are the same if
argument b attacks the sincerity or the competence of argument a.
Proof. Assume argument a and argument b are not attacked by other arguments.
We use case analysis.
Case 1 : Let argument b attack the sincerity dimension of the trustworthiness of
argument a. Meta-argument acc(b) is accepted, as supported by a trust-
worthy source and not attacked by external arguments, and meta-argument
Yacc(b),Ba is accepted. This means that meta-argument Ba is unaccepted, and
thus argument WBa,a is accepted, and meta-argument acc(a) is unaccepted.
Argument a is not part of any admissibility-based extension, and argument
b is part of the admissibility-based extensions.
Case 2 : Let argument b attack the competence dimension of the trustworthiness
of argument a. Meta-argument acc(b) is accepted, as supported by a trust-
worthy source and not attacked by external arguments, and argument Ba is
accepted, as supported by a trustworthy source. Then meta-argument YBa,a
is unaccepted, as attacked by argument acc(b), due to the conflict-free prin-
ciple. This means that meta-argument WBa,a is accepted, and meta-argument
acc(a) is unaccepted. Argument a is not part of any admissibility-based ex-
tension, and argument b is part of the admissibility-based extensions.
The extensions are the same whether argument b attacks the sincerity or the com-
petence of argument a.
5. Conclusions
Trust plays an important role in many research areas of artificial intelligence,
particularly in the semantic web and multiagent systems where the sources have
to deal with conflicting information from other sources. Building on the socio-
cognitive model of trust described in [1], and on previous work integrating trust
and argumentation [8], in this paper we presented a formal framework for model-
ing how different dimensions of the perceived trustworthiness of the source inter-
act to determine the acceptability of the message, and how deviations from such
expectation produce a specific feedback on source trustworthiness. Here, we ap-
plied this model to the case of sources exchanging and assessing arguments, but it
could easily be extended to the exchange of any kind of factual information. The
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reason why we focused first on argumentation is because this provides a window
on the agent’s reasoning.
In our model, the information sources are introduced into the argumentation
framework. In argumentation systems as ASPIC+, arguments come from a single
knowledge base and they have the form 〈{p, p→ q},q〉. We propose to introduce
the sources, e.g., 〈{1 : p,2 : p→ q},2 : q〉, by instantiating abstract argumentation
with the different knowledge bases of the sources using meta-argumentation. The
sources have the form of meta-arguments trust(s) in the meta-level. In this kind of
representation, all the sources are considered as trustworthy as soon as their meta-
argument are accepted in the meta-argumentation framework. A source which is
considered untrustworthy is attacked by means of those argument(s) explicating
that.
The arguments in the meta-argumentation framework need to be supported by
some evidence in order to be accepted. This kind of evidence is represented in the
model by means of an attack from the sources to the “default” meta-arguments
W (acc(arg1)) invalidating the acceptability of the arguments, e.g., arg1. The evi-
dence does not guarantee the acceptability of the arguments which can always be
attacked by other arguments, but an argument may be accepted if and only if there
is some evidence in favor of it.
The attacks to the trustworthiness of the sources can be focused on single
arguments or attacks. In particular, when an argument attacks the trustworthiness
of an information item, it is intended as an attack towards the item as proposed
by the source s. We model this kind of attacks as an attack in the meta-level
from the argument expressed against the trustworthiness of the information item
to the attack of the source proposing the item towards the “default” meta-argument
W (acc(arg1)).
We introduce the feedback from the information sources to their items and
converse. In such a way, when a source proposes a number of untrustworthy items
which overcomes a given threshold, then also the source becomes untrustworthy.
This is modelled as an attack from all the arguments proposed by a source s to a
specific pattern which is “activated” after n attacks. The activation of the pattern
leads to the activation of an attack from the pattern to the meta-argument trust(s).
Finally, we distinguish two dimensions of trust, namely sincerity and compe-
tence. This separation allows us to distinguish also the attacks towards the trust-
worthiness of the information items. In particular, the sources provide an evidence
in favor of the arguments by attacking indirectly meta-argument acc(arg1), with
an attack against meta-argument Barg1 . This meta-argument represents the beliefs
of source s. Thus an attack against Barg1 means that s is considered insincere con-
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cerning argument arg1. An attack against the support of Barg1 to meta-argument
acc(arg1) means that s is considered incompetent concerning argument arg1.
We address several issues as future research.
Following Castelfranchi and Falcone [1], only a cognitive agent can “trust”
another agent: only an agent endowed with goals and beliefs. In this model, first,
one trusts another only relatively to a goal, i.e., for something s/he want to achieve,
that s/he desires. Second, trust itself consists of beliefs. The first line of future
work consists in representing also the actions and the goals in our model to follow
this model. At time being, the implicit goal of the sources is to get their arguments
accepted.
The arguments in this paper are treated basically as black boxes, as it is most
often the case in works based on abstract argumentation, in the vein of [22]. This
is significant in two respects. First, we did not discuss the two-way relationship
between source trustworthiness and trust in the message when what is being com-
municated is not the argument as a whole, but rather one of its constituents, e.g.,
a premise, its conclusion, or the inference rule licensing the argument, as in [7].
Finding out that the source is mistaken on the truth of some premise (hence the
argument is unsound) rather than on the truth of the inference (hence the argu-
ment is invalid) is likely to have very different effects for the feedback on the
source, which will have to be investigated in future work. Second, we treat only
the case of valid arguments, again as it is customary in abstract argumentation
after [22]. This is of course a huge idealization with respect to everyday argu-
mentation: as underlined by Walton [31], we rarely exchange deductively valid
arguments, while the vast majority of arguments are defeasible, which implies a
different sort of consequence relation.
Finally, the framework does not capture the cumulative effect of converging
sources on argument acceptability. When more than one source offers the same
information item, its acceptability is positively affected, as discussed in [32].
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